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AN EXPRESS PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR
FUTURES INVESTORS: DOES SECTION 22 OF
THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
AFFORD ADEQUATE PROTECTION?
Section 22 of the Commodity Exchange Act is Congress' at-
tempt to provide futures investors with a clearly-defined private
right of action against futures exchanges and other futures profes-
sionals. While it answers certain questions that the Supreme
Court left open in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Cur-
ran, it leaves others to judicial interpretation. Taken together, the
language of section 22 and its case law define a cause of action
with several important advantages and disadvantages that the fu-
tures plaintiff must carefully consider in determining whether sec-
tion 22 is the appropriate basis for complaint. An aggrieved
futures investor may also seek redress under the Commodity Ex-
change Act's reparations provisions, civil RICO, and state law. In
comparing these alternatives, this Note provides a framework in
which the potential litigant may determine the appropriate
recourse.
INTRODUCTION
WHEN THE Supreme Court decided Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith v. Curran,1 it confined its holding to the single
proposition that an implied private cause of action is available to
aggrieved futures investors under the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA).2 The Court expressly declined comment on the issues of
law and proof regarding elements of liability, causation, and dam-
ages.' Thus, the private civil action given to futures investors was a
mere shell. It became the task of the courts-subject, of course, to
congressional intervention-to define and shape the elements of the
action.4
1. 456 U.S. 353 (1982). For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 55-94 and
accompanying text.
2. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982). Congress enacted the first statute regulating futures trad-
ing in 1921. This statute, known as the Futures Trading Act, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921)
(current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982)), was held to be an unconstitutional exercise of
the taxing power in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). The same regulatory scheme minus
the offending tax provision was promptly reenacted in the Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42
Stat. 998 (1922), which, upon amendment in 1936, was renamed the Commodity Exchange
Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982)).
3. 456 U.S. at 395.
4. Id.
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Unwilling to leave futures investors with an unwieldy and un-
certain judicial tool, Congress enacted section 22 of the CEA, which
supersedes Curran for actions that accrue after January 10, 1983.1
This provision authorizes an express private right of action and
gives substantive content to the elements of the action.6 This de-
lineation of the elements, however, may impose undesirable limita-
tions on the nature and scope of protection that investors in the
futures markets require.
Part I of this Note briefly describes futures trading practices
that give rise to investors' claims against brokers and futures ex-
changes. It also discusses the regulatory remedies that are available
to futures investors.7 Parts II and III examine the Curran Court's
approval of an implied private right of action and Congress' subse-
quent creation of a more detailed express private right of action.8 In
Part IV, this Note compares the content of the elements of a private
action brought under section 22 to an action brought under Cur-
ran.9 Finally, this Note compares the CEA actions to some alterna-
tive remedies which may prove more advantageous to certain
litigants.10
I. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
A. The Mechanics of Futures Trading11
A futures contract is a transaction between a seller, called a
short, and a buyer, called a long.12 The seller agrees to deliver to
the buyer a specified quantity and grade of an identified commodity
during a particular month in the future, and the buyer agrees to
5. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 235, 96 Stat. 2294, 2322 (1983)
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982)). The Supreme Court appears to approve of such congres-
sional action. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667 (1979), the Court wrote:
"When Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support their statutory
rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much when it creates those rights." Id. at
717.
6. See 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982).
7. See infra notes 11-54 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 55-103 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 104-93 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 194-227 and accompanying text.
11. A detailed explanation of futures trading is beyond the scope of this Note. For
comprehensive discussions, see generally P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION (1982)
and T. Russo, THE REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS
(1983).
12. 1 P. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 8 (discussing terminology applicable to futures
buyers and sellers). The CEA does not precisely define the term "futures contract." It refers
to such contracts as "[t]ransactions. . .involving the sale [of commodities] for future deliv-
ery as commonly conducted on boards of trade and known as 'futures.'" 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
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accept and pay for the commodity.13 The parties rarely exercise
their respective contractual rights; typically, they offset their con-
tracts by entering the market a second time to acquire the same type
of contract for which they bear an obligation opposite to their first
transaction. 14
1. Boards of Trade and Futures Commission Merchants
Futures contracts are bought and sold on boards of trade by
means of open outcry in a trading pit or ring. 5 Persons known as
floor brokers actually buy and sell futures contracts. 6 A board of
trade must be designated as a contract market by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in order to conduct trading
in a particular kind of futures contract.' 7
When an investor decides to enter the futures market, he opens
an account with a futures commission merchant (FCM). 8 The
CEA defines FCM to include individuals or organizations who so-
licit orders for futures trading.' 9 The futures investor places an or-
der to buy or sell futures contracts with one of the FCM's
associated persons, who are are sometimes called customer repre-
sentatives or account executives. 20 An account executive then relays
the order to the appropriate exchange where floor brokers execute
the transaction.2'
13. 1 P. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 8.
14. Id. at 9.
15. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 1.38(a) (1984). The term "board of trade" applies
to any exchange or any association of persons "who [engage] in the business of buying or
selling commodity [sic] or receiving the same for sale on consignment." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
A board of trade may thus engage in cash trading, commodities trading, futures trading, or
any combination thereof. See 1 P. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 70-7 1.
16. Johnson, The Changing Face of Commodity Regulation, PRAC. LAW., Dec. 1974, at
27.
17. 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1982). The expression "contract market" has two meanings: It identi-
fies the board of trade itself and also each of the futures contracts traded on it. 1 P. JOHNSON,
supra note 11, at 70. Because designation as a contract market is on a contract-by-contract
basis, each new futures contract proposed by a board of trade must be separately approved by
the CFTC. Id.
18. See G. GOLD, MODERN COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 18 (7th ed. 1975).
19. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). FCMs are analogous to brokerage houses in the securities busi-
ness. 1 P. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 101.
20. 1 T. Russo, supra note 11, § 4.02.
21. See Johnson, supra note 16, at 39; see also 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (definition of floor
broker).
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2. The Nature of Futures Trading: Risk-Shifting and Risk-
Taking
Futures trading is carried on by risk-shifters, called hedgers, and
risk-takers, called speculators. Hedgers are individuals (or organi-
zations) who seek to avoid the substantial risk that is associated
with adverse price movement in the commodities which they hold.2
They guard against such risk by selling an amount of futures that is
equal to their actual ownership of a commodity.23 If prices fall,
hedgers expect losses on the inventories of the actual commodity to
be offset by a profit in the futures market.24 Conversely, should
prices increase, the hedgers expect losses on the futures to be offset
by the higher value of the actual commodities owned by them.2" In
either case, a loss on one side of the transaction is ordinarily offset
by a profit on the other.26
Speculators absorb the risk transferred by the hedgers.
Although these futures investors voluntarily risk their capital in ex-
pectation of making a profit through changes in market prices, their
investments frequently produce losses rather than profits. 27 To en-
courage speculators to enter the market, a small margin deposit is
required as performance security against default in the obligation by
either party. 8 Without participation by speculators, markets
would lack the liquidity needed for effective risk transfer by
hedgers.29
22. See G. GOLD, supra note 18, at 10-14.
23. Id. at 13-14.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1974). For example, the plaintiff
in Hoetger & Co. v. Ascencio, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FtrT. L. RP. (CCH)
21,950 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 1983), experienced rapid gains then soaring losses while trad-
ing futures. He bought Treasury bill futures contracts and in two weeks reaped a total profit
of $21,700. Over the next year, however, the plaintiff lost nearly $250,000 trading the same
contracts. Id. at 28,090.
28. Johnson, supra note 16, at 32. For example, futures customers may invest in the
S&P 500, which is a type of futures contract based on fluctuations in Standard and Poor's
stock price index rather than on the value of an identifiable commodity. Such investments
require a margin deposit of less than $6000 to purchase an interest in a standard contract,
worth about $80,000. Stock Futures: A Hot New World, BUS. WK., Aug. 22, 1983, at 60.
While a small margin allows a speculator to be highly leveraged, downward price movement
may force him to pay in additional cash to prevent the FCM from liquidating his position in
the market. G. GOLD, supra note 18, at 283. In contrast to the small amount of margin
necessary to trade futures, the margin deposit required for trading stocks ranges between 50
and 100% of their value. Id. at 19-20.
29. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1974). Without speculative buying
and selling, trading volume would be restricted since many large orders would go unfilled due
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Even though risk is an inherent feature of futures trading, the
CFTC still requires that FCMs provide their customers with a risk
disclosure statement.30  Futures investors must sign the statement
to certify that they have read and understood it before the FCM
may open an account for them.3  As an additional precaution,
FCMs often will voluntarily screen investors by requiring a mini-
mum net worth before placing an order. 32 Of course, the disclo-
sures and other precautionary measures do not always insulate
FCMs from lawsuits by customers who incur losses. 33 The ag-
grieved investor may turn to the CEA for redress against fraudulent
trading practices and market manipulation, but not for protection
from misfortune caused purely by market forces.34 Both Curran
and section 22 of the CEA reflect this underlying purpose. They
serve as alternate means of protection for futures investors against
deceptive and misleading business practices, not as buffers against
unfavorable economic circumstances.
B. Regulation of Futures Trading
1. Limited Coverage Until 1974
Prior to the creation of the CFTC in 1974, regulation of futures
trading was within the purview of the Commodity Exchange Au-
thority, an agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.35 Coex-
istent with federal regulation were systems of self-regulation that
the futures exchanges created and enforced themselves.36
to the floor broker's inability to find an equally large but opposing hedge order at the same
price to complete the match. Id.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1984).
31. Id. One commentator has suggested that in cases where the customer requests fur-
ther disclosure of risk, the FCM has a duty to supply such additional information in a com-
plete and fair manner. 1 T. Russo, supra note 11, § 12.33.
32. For example, Dean Witter and other FCMs accept only investors who have a net
worth of at least $100,000, not including the value of their residences or insurance policies. A
New Way to Play the Market Catches On, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 1, 1983, at 65.
The CFTC does not require suitability or "know your customer" rules. See Adoption of
Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,888 (1978).
33. See 2 T. Russo, supra note 11, § 14.01; Hoetger & Co. v. Ascencio, (1982-1984
Transfer Binder] CoMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,950 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 1983).
34. 2 P. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 231.
35. 1 P. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 175. The Commodity Exchange Authority regu-
lated a limited number of agricultural products. 1 T. Russo, supra note 11, § 10.02.
36. 1 P. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 346-49. Even though the CFTC has been granted
broad rulemaking power, the CEA still requires exchange self-regulation that must meet with
CFTC approval. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8) (1982). Some of these rules are mandated by the CEA or
CFTC regulations. For example, exchanges must adopt certain rules as a condition of con-
tract market designation. See supra note 17. Likewise, the governing board of each contract
market must take whatever steps are necessary to prevent "manipulation of prices and the
[Vol. 35:72
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2. Expanded Coverage Through a New Federal Agency
In 1974, Congress overhauled the regulation of futures by enact-
ing the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, also known
as the 1974 Amendment.37 With the 1974 Amendment came a vast
expansion in futures regulation, accomplished in part through a
simple redefinition of the term "commodity."38 Prior to 1974, the
term included only a limited number of agricultural products.39
Under the 1974 Amendment, by contrast, the term "commodity"
encompasses not only a variety of agricultural products but also "all
other goods and articles" (with one exception4), together with all
"services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery
are presently or in the future dealt in. 41
Congress also created an independent agency, the CFTC, with
powers far broader than those held by its predecessor.42 Congress
authorized the new agency to oversee registration of futures profes-
sionals-previously, the task of the Commodity Exchange Author-
ity-and gave it the power to enforce the CEA's prohibition against
excessive speculation and fraudulent practices.43 Congress further
authorized the establishment of two remedial procedures-arbitra-
tion and reparations-for the protection of individual futures inves-
tors.' The reparations procedure is contained in section 14 of the
cornering of any commodity by the dealers or operators upon such board." 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)
(1982). Other rules are voluntarily adopted by the exchanges themselves. For instance, ex-
changes have rules that prohibit their employees from engaging in any futures trading: "No
employee of the Exchange shall: (1) trade directly or indirectly on any designated contract
market for either spot or future delivery in any commodity ...." RULES OF THE CHICAGO
MERCANTILE EXCH. Rule 254 (Chicago Mercantile Exch. 1984).
37. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982)).
38. See id. § 201, 88 Stat. at 1395 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)).
39. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current ver-
sion at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982)).
40. The CEA prohibits trading onion futures. 7 U.S.C. § 13-1 (1982).
41. Id. § 2.
42. 1974 Amendment § 101, 88 Stat. at 1389 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1982));
see also 1 P. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 175-77 (discussing underlying rationale for creation
of the CFrC).
43. The 1974 Amendment did not materially change the nature of the CEA's prohibi-
tions against such practices. See 7 U.S.C. § 6a (1982) (excessive speculation); 7 U.S.C. § 6b
(1982) (fraudulent practices).
Congress gave the CFTC some additional responsibilities. Whereas the Commodity Ex-
change Authority had regulated contract markets, FCMs, and floor brokers, 1 T. Russo,
supra note 11, § 10.01, the CFTC was given responsibility to regulate not only those entities
but also introducing brokers, 7 U.S.C. § 6d (1982), persons associated with FCMs or intro-
ducing brokers, id. § 6k, commodity pool operators, id. § 6n, commodity trading advisors,
id., and registered futures associations, id. § 21. 1 T. Russo, supra note 11, § 10.01.
44. For a discussion of reparations, see 2 P. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 150-96 and 2 T.
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CEA, and allows an aggrieved investor to file a claim for damages
against any person who is required to be registered and who alleg-
edly has violated the CEA or any CFTC rule or regulation. 5 The
complaining party must seek reparations within two years of the
time the cause of action accrues, 46 and may bring his claim before
an administrative law judge or any presiding officer designated by
the Commission.47 He may recover actual damages if he proves
that the violation proximately caused his loss. 48 The decision by the
hearing officer is final unless an appeal before the Commissioners is
granted. A final decision is reviewable by a federal court of
appeals.4 9
The arbitration provision in section 5a(l 1) of the CEA requires
that each exchange establish a procedure for the settlement of inves-
tors' claims and grievances against any of its members or employ-
ees.50 The futures investor participates voluntarily in the procedure
and may use it regardless of the amount of the claim.5 1 Arbitration
procedures must pass CFTC approval. 2
3. Private Rights of Action Prior to 1982
Before 1982, limited redress was available for individual futures
investors who brought claims based on alleged violations of the
CEA. In the appropriate circumstances, investors could use the
Commission's reparations procedure or an exchange's arbitration
program. 3 The opportunity to pursue a private action in federal
court was limited to those district and circuit courts that had recog-
nized the existence of such an action.5 This limitation on the pri-
Russo, supra note 11, §§ 14.02-.09. For a discussion of arbitration, see 1 P. JOHNSON, supra
note 11, at 283-94.and I T. Russo, supra note 11, § 1.36.
45. 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982).
46. Id.
47. 2 P. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 152.
48. 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982).
49. Id. § 18(e).
50. Id. §7a(l1).
51. Id. Until 1982, exchanges were required to have an arbitration procedure for claims
up to $15,000. See 1974 Amendment § 209, 88 Stat. at 1401 (current version at 7 U.S.C.
§ 7a(1 1) (1982)).
52. 1 T. Russo, supra note 11, § 1.36.
53. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 622 F.2d 216, 235 (6th
Cir. 1980), af'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 322 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd
sub noma. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Alken v. Lerner, 485 F.
Supp. 871, 879 (D.N.J. 1980); Witzel v. Chartered Sys. Corp., 490 F. Supp. 343, 347 (D.
Minn. 1980); Jones v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213, 220 (D. Kan. 1979); Smith
v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 114 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F.
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vate right of action became the focus of the Supreme Court's
decision in Curran and Congress' amendment of the CEA in 1982.
II. THE CURRAN DECISION-JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF AN
IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTION
A. Factual Background
In Curran, the Supreme Court consolidated several cases in
which futures investors brought suit against their FCMs or an ex-
change. 55 In one case, individual futures investors John and Jac-
queline Curran sued Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, their
FCM, for damages arising from that firm's alleged violation of the
antifraud provision of the CEA 6 In the other cases, several profes-
sional futures traders sued to recover losses they had incurred as a
result of an elaborate manipulation of the market in potato futures
contracts.57 The fraudulent scheme involved wrongdoing by vari-
ous groups of potato traders and producers, by several FCMs, and
by the New York Mercantile Exchange. 8 The complexity of the
scheme requires a brief explanation.
Neil Leist and several other professional futures traders were
engaged in the trading of Maine potato futures when, in 1976, they
became entangled in the largest default in the history of futures
Supp. 440, 447 (N.D. Ill. 1967). Contra Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 792 (5th
Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 456 U.S. 968 (1982); Hensley v. Maduff & Sons, Inc.,
(1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) % 21,017, at 23,985 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
1, 1980); Alkan v. Rosenthal & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,797, at 23,252 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 1979); Comstock Investors, Inc. v. Rosenthal
& Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,934, at 23,759 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 7, 1979); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 55 (N.D. Tex. 1979);
Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 323 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
55. The circuit court cases included Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), a.f'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d
Cir. 1980), afid sub nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). The
various actions by Leist and his co-plaintiffs were consolidated at the circuit court level. 638
F.2d at 285.
56. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982); see 456 U.S. at 369 n.42. The Currans had authorized an
FCM to trade in futures on their behalf. 456 U.S. at 368. Their trading was initially profita-
ble but later resulted in substantial losses, and the account was ultimately closed. Id. The
appeals court noticed and decided sua sponte that the Currans could maintain a private suit
under the CEA. Id. at 368-69.
57. Neil Leist was a member of the New York Mercantile Exchange and traded com-
modities and futures. 638 F.2d at 290. His co-plaintiffs were Incomco, a partnership which
was a licensed FCM, and Philip Smith, Incomco's managing partner. They were joined by
traders and dealers who represented a class of persons who, like Leist, Incomco, and Smith,
had bought futures contracts. Id.
58. 638 F.2d at 288-93.
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trading in the United States.59 They were caught in the crossfire of
a contest between two powerful groups of traders to control the
price of potatoes. The first group was composed of John Richard
Simplot and Peter J. Taggares, two large West Coast potato proces-
sors.6" They conspired to depress the price of potatoes by selling a
large number of futures contracts in that commodity.6 The second
group was composed of East Coast potato merchants who sought to
capitalize on a projected shortage in the potato supply by driving up
the price.62 To this end, they bought as many futures contracts in
potatoes as possible.6 3 At the same time, they attempted to ensure
their control over the price of potatoes by tying up lines of transpor-
tation that were essential to the sellers' ability to make deliveries.' 4
Leist and his co-plaintiffs, like the East Coast group, speculated
that the price of potatoes would rise.65 As part of their market
strategy, they not only invested in potato futures but also purchased
a quantity of actual potatoes.66 Their plan, however, proved unsuc-
cessful. The West Coast conspirators were successful in their efforts
to depress the price of potatoes, thus depriving the plaintiffs of gains
they might have realized in an unmanipulated market.67 For its
part, the East Coast group was successful in its attempt to tie up the
transportation that otherwise would have been available for deliv-
eries of the commodity.68 Substantial quantities of actual potatoes
59. 638 F.2d at 285. Sellers of almost 1,000 futures contracts failed to deliver approxi-
mately 50,000,000 pounds of Maine potatoes. Id. The futures contracts for the potatoes
provided for the delivery of a railroad car lot of 50,000 pounds of the commodity at a desig-
nated place on the Bangor & Aroostook Railroad during the period May 7 to May 25, 1976.
456 U.S. at 369. Trading in the contracts had begun early in 1975 and ended on May 7, 1976.
Id.
60. 638 F.2d at 289.
61. Id. At the end of trading in the potato futures contract, the West Coast producers
were in control of 1,893 open short positions. By comparison, the number of open positions
that exist at the end of trading under typical circumstances is approximately 200. Id. at 290.
Ironically, the USDA's crop forecast had projected a shortfall in the 1976 potato supply; the
Department's report indicated that total potato stocks were down 11% and that Maine stocks
totaled only 7.4 million hundredweight as compared with 13 million hundredweight the pre-
vious year. Id. at 289. This report was one of the factors responsible for the increase in the
price of the potato contract from $9.75 per hundredweight to a record high of $19.15 per
hundredweight by October 3, 1975. Id.
62. Id. at 290.
63. At the end of trading in the contract, the East Coast producers controlled 911 open
long positions. Id. at 289; cf supra note 61 (noting that, by comparison, relatively few open
positions in a contract usually exist at the end of trading).
64. 638 F.2d at 290.
65. Id. at 291.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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that the plaintiffs had purchased therefore rotted before delivery.6 9
As a result of the conspiracies, then, the plaintiffs not only were
precluded from even the possibility of profits that they might have
realized, but also incurred substantial losses that they might have
avoided in a market untouched by conspiracy.
Leist and his co-plaintiffs sued the two groups of conspirators,
the New York Mercantile Exchange, and the FCMs of the West
Coast group.7° They alleged that the conspirators and FCMs had
"used and employed manipulative devices and contrivances"71 in
violation of the CEA and had violated rules promulgated by the
CFTC. They accused the exchange of, among other things, negli-
gently failing to maintain an orderly market for the trading in
Maine potato futures.72
B. The Curran Decision
By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court held that an implied
private cause of action is available to a futures investor who suffers
losses resulting from a violation of the CEA.73 Such an investor
may maintain an action against his own FCM, against the FCMs of
other market participants, or against an exchange, depending on
which of these parties committed the alleged violation.74 The Court
expressly limited its holding merely to a determination of the exist-
ence of an implied private remedy, stating that "unless and until
Congress acts," the federal courts would be charged with "fill[ing]
in the interstices" of the cause of action.75 A determination of the
content of the liability, causation, and damage components of such
a suit would thus have to await judicial or congressional action.76
In the majority opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court first ex-
amined the criteria governing creation of private causes of action
69. Id.
70. Id. at 291-93.
71. Id.
72. Id. The Supreme Court explained that, although the complaint was not specific,
Leist and his co-plaintiffs apparently were seeking recovery against all defendants for viola-
tions of 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982) (antifraud) and 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982) (price manipulation);
against the FCMs and the two groups of merchants under 7 U.S.C. § 6a (1982) (excessive
speculation); and against the exchange under 7 U.S.C. § 7(d) (1982) (manipulation by ex-
changes) and 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8) (1982) (failure of exchange to enforce its rules). 456 U.S. at
372 n.49.
73. 456 U.S. at 390-91, 395.
74. Id. at 390, 393-94.
75. Id. at 395.
76. Id.
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under other federal statutes. 7 In Cort v. Ash,78 the Court articu-
lated four factors relevant to the determination of whether an im-
plied private remedy is appropriate.79 The second factor, which has
become preeminent since Cort,8" asks whether there is "any indica-
tion of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a
remedy or or to deny one. "81
In applying this congressional intent test to the CEA, the Court
first examined the "contemporary legal context" in which Congress
had enacted its substantial revision of the CEA in 1974.82 Accord-
ing to the Court, Congress' inaction regarding the statutory provi-
sions under which certain federal courts had recognized an implied
private remedy demonstrated an affirmative intent to preserve the
remedy.8 3
The majority found further evidence of such intent in the legis-
lative history of the Act.14 The 1974 Amendment addressed con-
cern that exchanges were not fulfilling their self-regulatory
responsibilities.8 5 Judicial recognition of the implied private cause
of action, in combination with a 1968 amendment to the CEA re-
quiring exchanges to enforce their rules, created an environment in
which the exchanges were sued for their failure to enforce such
rules.86 In response, the exchanges promulgated fewer rules,
thereby exposing the market to a greater risk of unfair trading.8 7
Rather than eliminate the implied cause of action, however, Con-
gress imposed additional rules upon the exchanges.88
77. Id. at 374-78.
78. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
79. Id. at 78.
80. Curran, 456 U.S. at 377-78 n.60.
81. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. The Court in Curran implicitly recognized the difference be-
tween intent to create a remedy and intent to preserve a remedy. The remedy in Cort had to
be created, but in Curran, some federal courts already had allowed a private right of action
under the CEA at the time of the 1974 Amendment. Thus, the congressional intent inquiry
in Curran looked to whether Congress intended to preserve the remedy, rather than whether
Congress intended to grant it. See Curran, 456 U.S. at 377-82.
82. Id. at 381; see also supra text accompanying notes 37-54 (discussion of 1974
Amendment).
83. 456 U.S. at 381-82. The Court adopted the presumption that Congress had knowl-
edge of the case law and federal regulation interpreting the 1974 Amendment. See id. at 382
& n.66.
84. Id. at 382-88.
85. Id. at 382-83.
86. Id. at 383 & n.71.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 384. The Court refuted the argument that the arbitration and reparations
remedies included in the 1974 Amendment were intended to supplant the implied cause of
action. Those remedies, said the Court, were too limited to provide effective means of com-
[Vol. 35:72
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
Moreover, the Court viewed the savings clause in section 2 of
the CEA as direct evidence of legislative intent to preserve the im-
plied private remedy. 9 The Court cited the language stating that
"[n]othing in this section shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction
conferred on the courts of the United States" to support its conclu-
sion that Congress intended to preserve federal court actions in fu-
tures regulation.9"
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Powell launched a three-point at-
tack against the majority's holding.91 He first asserted that the ma-
jority had relied on an erroneously decided lower court opinion,
together with a line of cases derived from it, as evidence for the
existence of a private cause of action.9 2 He then attacked the "con-
temporary legal context" theory on the grounds that congressional
inaction should not signal a "conscious intent to 'preserve' the [judi-
cial] right of action that [had been] mistakenly created."93 Finally,
Justice Powell questioned why Congress would establish arbitration
and reparations procedures while concurrently approving the im-
plied private cause of action.94
III. THE SECTION 22 PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION-CONGRESS'
RESPONSE TO CURRAN
While the U.S. Supreme Court was considering Curran, mem-
bers of the House Agriculture Committee were laying the ground-
pensating injured futures customers or to enforce compliance with the statute. Id. at 384-85.
Furthermore, the legislative history revealed statements by members of both houses of Con-
gress indicating that arbitration and reparations were not intended to interfere with the judi-
cial remedy. Id. at 385-86. For example, Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman
Talmadge explained that the reparations procedure was "not intended to interfere with the
courts in any way." 120 CONG. REC. 30,459 (1974).
89. 456 U.S. at 386.
90. Id. at 386-87; see also Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Hearings on S.
2485, S. 2578, S. 2837 and H.R. 13,113 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and For-
estry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 205 (1974) (statement of Sen. Clark) ("Often the most effective
enforcement tool is a private suit .. ").
91. Curran, 456 U.S. at 395-409 (Powell, J., dissenting).
92. Justice Powell contended that Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D.
Ill. 1967) had been decided on a common law principle which did not apply in a federal court
of limited jurisdiction. Id. at 398-99. For representative cases that follow the principle ar-
ticulated in Goodman, see Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 113 (1973); Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), affid sub nom. Miller v. New York Produce Exch., 550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977). The majority opinion in Curran traced the development of
a private cause of action against exchanges from Goodman to subsequent cases, most of
which were decided at the district court level. 456 U.S. at 391-92.
93. 456 U.S. at 401 (Powell, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 405.
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work for reauthorization of the CFTC. The reauthorization
hearings gave Congress an ideal opportunity to debate whether fu-
tures investors should be given an express private right of action.95
House Agriculture Committee members approved the express
private right of action in advance of the Supreme Court's decision
as a means to protect futures investors and maintain the credibility
of the futures market.96 If, as one Committee member argued, the
CFTC were "strangled by budget limitations," futures investors
could resort to private lawsuits. 97 Despite the strong justifications
for congressional approval of the private remedy, however, the Sen-
ate Agriculture Committee chose to wait until Curran was
95. See CFTC Reauthorization: Hearings on H.R. 5447 Before the Subcomrn. on Conser-
vation, Credit, and Rural Development of the House Comm on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 174-75 (statements of Rep. Glickman) (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. Without
congressional reauthorization, the CFTC would have ceased operations on September 30,
1982. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, § 20, 92 Stat. 865, 875 (amended
1982). Current authorization extends until 1986. 7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (1982).
While the Curran Court framed the issue as whether a private "cause of action" exists
under the CEA, 456 U.S. at 395, Congress called § 22 a private "right of action." 7 U.S.C.
§ 25 (1982). Whereas some courts have treated the terms "cause of action" and "right of
action" as interchangeable, Neon Corp. v. Pennsylvania Distilling Co., 325 Pa. 140, 142, 188
A. 825, 826 (1936), other courts have distinguished them:
A cause of action consists of two elements: the operative facts and the right or
power to seek or obtain redress for the infringement of a legal right which the facts
show. Consequently, to engage in a semantic discussion of the distinction between a
"cause of action" and a "right of action" is of little help here as the latter is, by
definition, an integral part of the former.
Fratelli v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 186, 188 n.6 (Ist Cir. 1967) (citations
omitted).
If there is a meaningful difference between the terms, "right of action" is more precise.
Section 22 merely grants aggrieved futures investors the right to judicial redress against indi-
viduals and exchanges. Once a set of facts-that is, a cause of action-in which a futures
investor is injured arises, the plaintiff may exercise the § 22 right to recover damages. Strictly
speaking, then, the Curran Court was also concerned with whether a "right of action," rather
than a cause of action, existed. See 456 U.S. at 374. It was not ruling on the factual suffi-
ciency of the plaintiff's claim.
96. H.R. REP. No. 565, pt. I, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 1-52, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3871, 4000-01. The Committee approved the reauthorization including
the private right of action on April 22, 1982. Id. Curran was decided May 3, 1982. 456 U.S.
at 353. The Chairman of the House Agriculture Subcommittee stated:
At the time the Committee considered H.R. 5447 [the CFTC reauthorization], the
Supreme Court had not yet resolved the issue of whether a private right of action
could be implied under the Act. The Committee is of the view that the right of an
aggrieved person to sue a violator of the Act is critical to protecting the public and
fundamental to maintaining the credibility of the futures markets.
128 CONG. REC. H7486 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1982) (statement of Rep. Ed Jones).
97. Hearings, supra note 95, at 175 (statement of Rep. Glickman). The Committee also
might have acted in response to the limitations inherent in the CFTC reparations program.
As the following chart indicates, aggrieved futures investors who brought claims during fiscal
years 1976-80 experienced substantial delays before their claims were resolved.
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decided.9"
Once the Court announced its decision and it was clear that the
opinion contained no details concerning the scope of the private
cause of action, House Committee members had a further justifica-
tion for having provided prospective plaintiffs and defendants with
a statutory scheme.9 9 The full House approved the Agriculture
Committee's inclusion of a carefully articulated private right of ac-
tion in the CFTC reauthorization."w When members of the House
and Senate met to resolve differences in their proposals, the Senate
conferees agreed to include the private right of action in the final
version of the bill.10' The Chairman of the Senate Agriculture
Committee justified his concurrence by stating that "this area of the
law is new and uncharted. . . . [The express private right of ac-
tion] would be helpful in clarifying the limits of liability for viola-
tions of the Act." 10 2
When the Futures Trading Act of 1982103 was enacted on Janu-
ary 11, 1983, aggrieved futures investors could, for the first time,
raise claims based on an express private right of action.
STATUS OF REPARATIONS CASES
Fiscal Pending as of
Year Docketed Closed Year End
1976 25 0 25
1977 319 70 274
1978 303 198 379
1979 535 174 740
1980 741 278 1,203
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1980 at 28 (1980).
98. S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1982). The subcommittee assigned to the
reauthorization declined to act while Curran was pending before the Supreme Court. Id.
99. The House Agriculture Committee Chairman said the private action "should be
adopted [since] the Court answered [but] one of the several questions that have plagued the
courts, plaintiffs and defendants." 128 CONG. REc. H7484 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1982) (state-
ment of Rep. de ]a Garza). One Committee member who was particularly critical of the
Supreme Court's approach argued that the Curran opinion was "so nonspecific and inarticu-
late" that it would probably take years for the lower courts to define the elements of the
private action. Id. at H7490 (statement of Rep. Glickman).
100. H.R. 5447, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 236 (1982), 128 CONG. REc. H7503 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1982).
101. H.R. REP. No. 964, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4055, 4069.
102. 128 CONG. REc. S14,813 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of Sen. Helms).
103. Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982)).
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IV. SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR AGGRIEVED FUTURES
INVESTORS UNDER SECTION 22, CURRAN, AND OTHER
CAUSES OF ACTION
The implied private remedy available under Curran will be
short-lived. It covers only those actions that accrued prior to Janu-
ary 11, 1983.1" This judicially authorized cause of action serves,
however, as a useful benchmark against which to measure the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the express private right of action
under section 22.
A. Comparison of the Causes of Action Under Section 22 and
Curran
1. Parties Involved in Futures Litigation
In contrast to Curran, which gives plaintiffs little guidance, sec-
tion 22 comprehensively describes how plaintiffs are to implement
their right of action. For instance, only those investors who are
actually involved in the futures markets may bring an action under
section 22.1"5 An owner of an actual commodity who does not
trade futures contracts but who experiences a loss in the value of
that commodity due to price manipulation in futures markets may
not sue market participants." 6 If, however, a futures investor ex-
periences a loss due to price manipulation, he may have an action
against several defendants.
Section 22(a) provides that an aggrieved futures investor may
sue certain market participants as individuals. First, the investor
may bring an action against his FCM °7 or against individuals who
provide him with trading advice. 08 The action is available regard-
less of whether the futures investor is buying or selling futures, op-
tions on futures, or options on physical commodities.' 9 Second, a
futures investor who deals with a broker of non-exchange options,
leverage contracts, 110 or interests in commodity pools 1' may main-
104. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(d).
105. H.R. REP. No. 565, pt. I, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3871, 3906.
106. Id.
107. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1)(B) (1982).
108. Id. § 25(a)(l)(A).
109. See id. § 25(a)(1)(B). An option gives the buyer the right to buy or sell something at
a specific price within a specified period of time. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMIS-
SION, GLOSSARY OF SOME TERMS COMMONLY USED IN THE FUTURES TRADING INDUSTRY
20 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CFTC GLOSSARY].
110. Leverage contracts (also known as margin accounts, margin contracts, and leverage
accounts) are futures contracts not traded on any exchange; investor participation is solicited
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tan an action against such a broker. 12
Third, a futures investor may sue individuals with whom he is
not in privity. Any investor who buys or sells any type of futures or
options and who sustains actual damages caused by a manipulation
of the price of the contract or of its underlying commodity may sue
the manipulator despite the absence of privity. " 3 Futures investors
may also sue individuals who willfully aid, abet, counsel, induce, or
procure the commission of a violation of the CEA. I
4
In addition to the individual defendants discussed in section
22(a), certain organizations and their employees may be sued if they
fit within the requirements of section 22(b).115 Section 22(b) pro-
vides that futures investors whose claims arise from transactions
that are subject to the rules governing contract markets may have a
cause of action against a contract market, 1 6 its clearing organiza-
tion,' 1 7 a licensed board of trade,"' or a registered futures associa-
tion. 1 9 Investors may also sue the controlling persons or
employees of these organizations.'
20
2. Types of Violations Actionable
On its face, the language of subsections (a) and (b) appears to
differentiate between individual defendants and organizational de-
by sellers, typically through mailings. See CFTC GLOSSARY, supra note 109, at 16; 7 U.S.C.
§ 23 (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 31.4 (1984).
111. Commodity pools are similar to investment trusts or syndicates in that individuals
or firms solicit or accept funds, securities, or property for trading futures contracts. CFTC
GLOSSARY, supra note 109 at 6; see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 6m-6o (1982) (governing commodity
pools).
112. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1)(C) (1982). The class of defendants subject to suit under the
CFTC reparations procedure is smaller than under the private action. A futures investor
may seek reparations only against a "person who is registered under the chapter." Id.
§ 18(a). The CEA requires registration of FCMs and their associates, introducing brokers
and their associates, floor brokers, associates of CPOs, and associates of CTAs. See id. §§ 6e,
6f, 6k.
113. Id. § 25(a)(1)(D); Abraham & Frankhauser, A Review of the Major Revisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act, COMMODITIES L. LETTER, Feb. 1983, at 3.
114. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (1982).
115. Id. § 25(b).
116. See supra note 17 and accompanying text for discussion of contract markets.
117. A clearing organization is an adjunct to a commodity exchange through which
transactions executed on the floor of the exchange are settled. CFTC GLOSSARY, supra note
109, at 5.
118. See supra note 15 for discussion of the functions of a board of trade.
119. A futures association is a self-regulatory organization of the futures industry pat-
terned after the National Association of Securities Dealers. H.R. REP. No. 565, pt. 1, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3871, 3890.
120. 7 U.S.C. § 25(b)(3) (1982).
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fendants with respect to the scope of actionable violations. While
subsection (b) states that any violation of the CEA, CFTC rules, or
rules of organizations subject to the CEA is a sufficient basis upon
which to sue an offending organization, subsection (a) seems to con-
fine the scope of litigation against individual defendants to viola-
tions of the CEA itself.121
The two theories that attempt to explain this difference reach
opposing conclusions about the scope of actionable violations under
subsection (a). According to the first theory, the language of sec-
tion 22(a) totally excludes the possibility of a private right of action
based on a violation of a CFTC rule. 122 Had Congress wanted sub-
section (a) to have the broad coverage provided in subsection (b),
proponents of this "total exclusion" theory argue, it would have
used language like that in subsection (b). For this reason, Congress
must have deliberately confined the scope of subsection (a) to viola-
tions of the Act itself. 123
While the first theory argues that the language of section 22(a)
totally excludes suits based on CFTC rule violations, the second
theory takes the position that only certain CFTC rules are excluded
from the set of actionable violations contemplated by section
22(a).124 Proponents of this "partial exclusion" approach point out
that the CEA, in certain of its provisions, specifically prohibits ac-
tivities which are "contrary to any rule, regulation, or order of the
Commission" that is adopted pursuant to the particular provi-
sion. 125 Any violation of one of these rules would therefore consti-
tute a violation of the CEA itself. For example, an option
transaction which fails to comply with CFTC rules made pursuant
to section 4c(b) of the CEA would, under the language of that sec-
tion, violate the CEA and thus give rise to an action under section
121. Compare id. § 25(a)(1) ("Any person ... who violates this chapter. . . shall be
liable .... ) with id. § 25(b)(1) ("[An] organization ... that fails to enforce any bylaw,
rule, regulation or resolution that it is required to enforce by the Commission . . . [or in
enforcing such rule] violates this chapter or any Commission rule, regulation or order...
shall be liable ... ").
122. 2 T. Russo, supra note 11, § 14.14.
123. Id. Section 14 of the CEA, which governs the reparations procedure, is another
instance where Congress, in defining the scope of actionable violations, specifically made ref-
erence not only to the CEA but also to the rules, regulations, and orders promulgated there-
under. 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982). There is no indication in the legislative history, however, that
the private action was to be patterned after the reparations procedure. See H.R. REP. No.
565, pt. I, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3781.
124. Abraham & Frankhauser, supra note 113, at 4.
125. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 23(b) (1982) (governing leverage contracts in gold and silver bullion
and bulk gold and silver coins).
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22(a). 126
The total exclusion theory provides little protection for ag-
grieved futures investors under section 22(a). The partial exclusion
theory offers better-though still not comprehensive-protection in
the area where futures investors most need it, that is, in cases of
fraudulent practices. A futures investor might encounter these
practices in any type of futures trading: in a futures transaction, in
an options transaction, 27 in a leverage transaction,121 or when deal-
ing with a commodity pool operator (CPO) or a commodity trading
advisor (CTA).
Unlike the total exclusion theory, the partial exclusion theory
would permit the futures investor to base a cause of action upon
violations of options and leverage contract rules. Thus, the partial
exclusion theory better protects investors, inasmuch as the rules,
rather than the statutes, flesh out the protections against fraud in
options trading and leverage transactions. 29
Current judicial interpretation of section 4b, 3 the general an-
tifraud provision, and section 4o,'1' the antifraud provision that ap-
plies to CPOs and CTAs, may also provide futures investors relief
without recourse to CFTC rules. Aggrieved investors have success-
fully brought actions under section 4b against their account execu-
tives for making false representations, 132 trading of a customer's
126. See id. § 6c(b).
127. Fraud in options has prompted both congressional and administrative action. Con-
gress banned option trading in agricultural commodities in 1936. Commodity Exchange Act,
Pub. L. No. 74-675, § 4c, 49 Stat. 1491, 1492 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982)).
This prohibition has only recently been relaxed. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-444, tit. II, §§ 206(1), (2), 96 Stat. 2296, 2301 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982)). In
1978, Congress imposed a general prohibition on nonagricultural commodity options. Fu-
tures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, § 3(3), 92 Stat. 865, 867 (current version at 7
U.S.C. § 6c(c) (1982)). Trading in these options may resume if the CFTC proves to Congress
that it has the ability successfully to regulate these transactions. Id. Limited trading in op-
tions on nonagricultural commodities is now authorized through a CFTC pilot program. 17
C.F.R. § 33.4 (1984); see also 48 Fed. Reg. 41,575 (1983) (background on pilot program).
The Commission has also authorized a pilot program for the trading of agricultural commod-
ities. 45 Fed. Reg. 2752 (1984) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 33).
128. Leverage transactions also have been restricted. See supra note 110.
129. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982) (governing options) and 7 U.S.C. § 23 (1982) (gov-
erning leverage transactions) with 17 C.F.R. § 32.1-.12 (1984) (regulating options) and 17
C.F.R. § 32.1-.24 (1984) (regulating leverage transactions).
130. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982).
131. Id. § 6o.
132. Notkin v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,236, at 25,161 (CFTC Aug. 25, 1981) (false creation of
reasonable expectations in customer can be fraud under § 4b).
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account without prior authorization,1 33 churning of a customer's
account, 34 and deducting money from a customer's account with-
out repaying the sum. 1 35 Moreover, in at least one case a pattern of
violations of CFTC rules constituted important evidence of a sec-
tion 4b violation.' 36 Even if a "total exclusion" rule were to pro-
hibit suits solely based on violations of CFTC rules, then, injured
investors may be able to base claims on section 4b, using CFTC
rules violations as powerful evidence of the defendant's fraudulent
dealings. Similarly, section 4o, which proscribes fraud by CPOs
and CTAs, has assisted investors in raising claims without having to
rely on CFTC rules. Aggrieved futures investors have successfully
sued their CPOs and CTAs under this section for misusing trading
advice, 137 making false statements in solicitation,138 and failing to
follow a customer's instructions. 39 Section 4o itself, however, may
not always be broad enough to afford complete protection. 14° For
example, even though CFTC rule 4.22141 requires a CPO to report
133. Haltmier v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 554 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir. 1977)
(§ 4b directly proscribes unauthorized trading by a broker); accord, Herman v. T&S Com-
modities, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 601, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
134. McGaughey v. Hogan-Orr, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,076, at 24,350 (CFTC July 31, 1980) (churning of customer's account, which
generates commissions without regard to customer's investment objectives, violates § 4b).
135. Brostrup v. Comvest, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,316, at 25,569 (CFTC Dec. 7, 1981) (deducting money from customer's account
for the purpose of investment management but never investing it nor returning it to the cus-
tomer constituted fraudulent conversion in violation of § 4b).
136. In Quigley v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,330, at 25,597 (CFTC Jan. 22, 1982), the administrative law judge
found that repeated failure to comply with 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(a-1)(1) (1984) constituted impor-
tant evidence of a violation of § 4b. That rule requires, in part, that account executives time-
stamp customer orders.
137. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 285-86 (9th Cir.
1979) (where CTA gave trading advice with knowledge that the advice was incorporated
directly into trades on customer's behalf and then bought and sold opposite those customer
orders, such transactions operated as a fraud on those customers and violated § 40(1)).
138. Behl v. Stanford Management Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,935, at 28,036 (CFTC Dec. 7, 1983) (use of false and fraudulent statements
in connection with solicitation of funds from a customer was a violation of §§ 4b and 4o).
139. Davidson v. Boesch, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
1 22,015, at 28,557 (CFTC Feb. 17, 1984) (by ignoring customer's order to transfer his invest-
ment out of pooled account and into individual trading account, by performing unauthorized
trades of customer's account, and by refusing to liquidate customer's account, CPO violated
§§ 4b(A) and 4o(1)).
140. See id. The Davidson decision also cited a violation of 17 C.F.R. § 4.22 (1984) (re-
quiring reports to pool participants). Davidson, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L.
REP. (CCH) at 28,557. It is not clear whether the plaintiff's damage award included losses
suffered as a result of that violation.
141. 17 C.F.R. § 4.22 (1984).
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to his customers, the Act does not contain a similar requirement. 142
Thus, a futures investor may be unable to sue his CPO for a viola-
tion of this rule.
A third approach would enable aggrieved futures investors to
sue section 22(a) defendants for violations of any CFTC rule what-
soever. The underpinning for this theory is found in section 8a(5)
of the CEA, which authorizes the CFTC "to make and promulgate
such rules and regulations as, in the judgment of the Commission,
are reasonably necessary to effectuate any of the provisions or to
accomplish any of the purposes of [the CEA]." 143 The aggrieved
investor could assert that the violated rule was, by virtue of section
8a(5), so inextricably linked to the CEA as to bring its violation
within the scope of section 22(a).
Judicial rejection of both the partial exclusion theory and the
section 8a(5) analysis would effectively remove CFTC rules viola-
tions by section 22(a) defendants from the jurisdiction of federal
courts. The aggrieved futures investor in such a case would have to
resort to the CFTC reparations procedure, where he would be able
to frame a complaint for violations of both the CEA and CFTC
rules. 144 The disadvantage, however, is that use of the reparations
procedure precludes the investor from pursuing the same claim
under other laws, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act 45 and state common law. 141
Like sections 22(a) and 22(b), the Curran decision appears to
allow claims based on all violations of the CEA. Not only did the
Supreme Court phrase the issue in Curran broadly enough to pro-
vide such comprehensive coverage, but it also deemphasized the
sections of the CEA actually at issue and focused instead on Con-
gress' intent with respect to the entire CEA. 147
142. See 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1982).
143. Id. § 12a(5).
144. CEA § 14(a) allows redress for "any violation of any provision of this chapter, or
any rule, regulation or order issued pursuant to the chapter." 7 U.S.C. § 18(a). The D.C.
Circuit recently addressed the question of jurisdictional limitations in the CFTC reparations
procedure. In Schor v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Nos. 83-1703 and 83-1704
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1984) (available Oct. 10, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file), the
court held that the CFTC has no power to adjudicate counterclaims based on common law
remedies, implicitly recognizing that the Commission's authority is restricted to resolving
claims based upon the CEA and its regulations.
145. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
146. See infra notes 194-227 and accompanying text for further discussion of these alter-
native remedies.
147. 456 U.S. at 369 n.42, 372 n.49; see Miller, Highlights of Recent Federal Court Cases,
COMMODITIEs L. LE'rER, Apr. 1983, at 7.
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Curran may also be compared to section 22(a) regarding
whether violations of Commission rules are actionable. Although
the Curran opinion does not specifically address this point,14 the
Court's silence may evince tacit approval of causes of action based
on CFTC rules. If Congress intended to deny section 22(a) actions
based on some or all rules violations, as the partial and total exclu-
sion theories argue, the less detailed Curran cause of action may
afford investors greater protection. The extent of the advantage to
Curran litigants over section 22(a) litigants, then, depends on how
broadly courts interpret section 22(a).
3. Level of Culpability
Section 22(a) fails to state the level of culpability that is required
to establish a cause of action against an individual who violates the
CEA. 49 Courts disagree about the appropriate level of culpability
required in actions against individuals.1 50 Some courts have applied
a "deliberate but without evil intent" standard, holding that one
who violates the CEA must have done so intentionally, but need not
have schemed to defraud his customers in order to be culpable.'
Similarly, one court ruled that the commodity professional need
"not have had an evil motive or an affirmative intent to injure his
customer," nor the subjective desire to cheat or defraud his cus-
tomer to be culpable, but merely have intended to violate the stat-
ute.152 Moreover, a commodity professional may violate section 4b
of the CEA even though his unauthorized activities were well-
meant.15' The defendant in one case had "intentionally and deliber-
ately" undertaken unauthorized transactions in the hope that they
would turn out profitably for his customer.' 54
In contrast, some courts have required not only a deliberate act,
but also knowledge by the defendant that his action defrauded his
148. 456 U.S. at 395.
149. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a) (1982).
150. See 2 P. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 310-23.
151. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 285 (9th Cir.
1979). The burden of proof required for a number of CEA violations was at issue in Savage.
The court applied the "deliberate without evil intent" standard to a violation of CEA § 4o, 7
U.S.C. § 6o (1982). It applied the "deliberate with evil intent" standard, however, to a viola-
tion of CEA § 4b, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982), based on the different wording of § 4o and § 4b.
152. Haltmier v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 554 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir.
1977); see also Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir.
1977).
153. Haltmier, 554 F.2d at 562.
154. Id.
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customers before finding culpability.155 One court found such a
"deliberate with evil intent" violation where the defendant entered
into prearranged trades between himself and his customers. 5 6 He
would be the buyer when filling a sell order for his customers, and
be the seller when filling a buy order for them.157 By controlling
both the buying and selling functions, he profited and his customers
lost. Thus, the sole purpose of his scheme was fraudulent.
Under section 22(b), plaintiffs must prove bad faith on the part
of the organization or controlling person whose action or inaction
allegedly caused the harm. 158 The bad faith standard that was used
in pre-Curran cases and will probably be applied in section 22(b)
cases is very much like the "deliberate with evil intent" standard
under section 22(a). One court, for example, dismissed a plaintiffis
complaint because it contained no allegation of bad faith amounting
to fraud.'5 9 The court defined bad faith as "ulterior motive, for ex-
ample, personal gain."'" Consequently, the higher bad faith stan-
dard may give defendants in subsection (b) actions an advantage
over subsection (a) defendants, depending on which culpability
standard a particular jurisdiction applies in subsection (a) cases.
Although section 22(b) specifies a bad faith standard, it says
nothing about how the standard is to be applied. 6' While courts
agree that bad faith is required to prove culpability for affirmative
acts by an exchange,' 62 they disagree about whether the same stan-
dard should apply to an exchange's failure to act. Traditionally,
courts have required a showing of negligence where an exchange's
inaction was at issue. 6 But recently, in Jordon v. New York Mer-
cantile Exchange,'" the court applied the bad faith standard to an
exchange's inaction as well as its action.165 The court based its
holding on section 22, even though that provision was not enacted
155. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283 (9th Cir. 1979).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 275.
158. 7 U.S.C. § 25(b) (1982).
159. P.J. Taggares v. New York Mercantile Exch., 476 F. Supp. 72, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
160. Id. at 77 n.22.
161. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(b) (1982).
162. E.g., P.J. Taggares Co. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 476 F. Supp. 72, 76
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[A]bsent allegations of bad faith [ the commodity exchange and its offi-
cials] may not be held for discretionary actions taken in the discharge of their duties pursuant
to the rules and regulations of the Exchange.").
163. E.g., Strax v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 936, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
164. [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,856, at 27,587
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1983).
165. Id. at 27,595.
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until after the cause of action arose.166 Inasmuch as section 22 pro-
vided a cause of action for both exchange action and inaction, the
court argued, one standard should apply. 167
In Curran, the Court gave no indication as to what should be
the standard of culpability. 68 Thus, a court deciding a case based
upon a Curran private right of action must turn to case law for
guidance.
In most cases, an aggrieved futures investor gains no advantage
by basing his cause of action on Curran instead of section 22 since
courts would probably apply the same standard of culpability. In
cases where investors have sued individuals, courts will probably
require proof in both Curran and section 22(a) lawsuits that the
individual acted either deliberately but without evil intent or delib-
erately with evil intent, in accordance with the standard applied to
similar cases in the pre-Curran era.1 69 In cases where the investor
has sued an exchange for taking some affirmative action in violation
of the CEA, CFTC rules, or its own rules, courts will probably re-
quire proof in both Curran and section 22(b) lawsuits that the ex-
change acted in bad faith. Such a result is justified because courts
applied the bad faith standard to cases involving affirmative viola-
tions by exchanges prior to the Curran decision.170 The one type of
case in which a Curran claim would likely be more advantageous to
an investor than a section 22 claim is where the investor sues an
exchange for its failure to take some action required by the CEA,
CFTC rules, or its own rules. Courts will apply a negligence stan-
dard when the cause of action is based upon Curran, rather than
applying the bad faith standard of section 22(b).171 In at least one
case, however, the court adopted bad faith as the level of culpability
for an exchange's inaction.' 72
Thus, Curran and section 22 differ little in the area of standards
of culpability. The plaintiff who sues under Curran rather than the
statute would gain an advantage only in lawsuits based upon an
exchange's failure to act.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 456 U.S. at 395.
169. See supra note 151.
170. See supra note 162.
171. See supra note 163.
172. Jordon v. New York Mercantile Exch., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,856, at 27,587 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1983). But see Gordon v. Hunt, 558 F.
Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Curran . . . could well be argued to authorize suit on a less
restrictive basis.").
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4. Causation
Section 22 requires the plaintiff in a futures case to show a
causal connection between the violation and his loss.173 The causa-
tion language appears in both subsection (a) and subsection (b), but
neither subsection defines causation. 174 Subsection (a) does provide,
however, that the losses must have resulted from one of the four
types of transactions outlined in that provision. 175 Similarly, sub-
section (b) states that the losses must have resulted from a transac-
tion "on or subject to the rules of [the] contract market or licensed
board of trade," and that they must have been caused either by the
organization's failure to enforce its rules or by its having enforced
the rules in violation of the CEA or associated rules. 176 The same
requirements apply in cases where controlling persons or employees
of the organizations are named as subsection (b) defendants. 177 In-
asmuch as the Curran Court declined to rule on causation, 178 courts
must examine other cases to decide causation issues in claims aris-
ing under Curran as well as under section 22.
Causation problems arise primarily in cases that involve failure
to register and misrepresentation. Where account executives have
failed to comply with the registration requirement, plaintiffs have
often been unable to show that their losses were causally linked to
the lack of registration. 79 In one case, for example, the court indi-
cated that a turn in the market, rather than the failure to register,
had caused the plaintiff's losses. 180 A court applying section 22
would probably have reached the same conclusion, because section
22 says that direct rather than indirect causation must be shown. 81
Where causation questions arise with respect to misrepresenta-
tion, two slightly different rules emerge. 82 Under the first rule, a
173. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 25(a) (1), (b)(1)-(3) (1982).
174. See id.
175. Id. § 25(a)(1).
176. Id. § 25(b)(l)-(2).
177. Id. § 25(b)(3).
178. 456 U.S. at 395.
179. Eg., International Cattle Sys. v. Parsons, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FtrT.
L. REP. (CCH) 21,367, at 25,756 (D. Kan. Mar. 9, 1982).
180. Hoetger & Co. v. Ascencio, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,950, at 28,094 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 1983).
181. Liability of individuals is predicated upon "damages resulting from. . . transactions
[under the subsection] and caused by such violation." 7 U.S.C. § 25(a) (1982) (emphasis
added). Liability of organizations is based on "damages. . . that resulted from such transac-
tion and were caused by such failure to enforce or enforcement of such bylaws, rules, regula-
tions or resolutions." Id. § 25(b)(1) (emphasis added).
182. See 2 P. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 359.
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plaintiff must show that he attached importance to a misstatement
or omission of information by the account executive, and that he
was thereby influenced to act differently than he would have acted
had he known the true facts.18 3 In other words, the plaintiff must
have relied on the account executive's misstatement or omission.1 8 4
The second rule presumes that the plaintiff has relied on the misrep-
resentation, but permits rebuttal of the presumption.18 5 Because the
burden of proof differs between the two rules, the result that a court
would reach in either a Curran action or a section 22 action is, in
large measure, a function of which rule the court adopts.
5. Damages
Subsections (a) and (b) of section 22 both state that successful
plaintiffs may recover actual damages for violations of the CEA.8 6
Damages awarded in futures cases interpreting the CEA are limited
to compensation for out-of-pocket losses or for lost profits.1, 7 The
treatment of damages in section 22 reflects the current state of the
law in futures trading. Courts traditionally have not allowed recov-
ery for punitive damages, for damages unrelated to the violation, or
for consequential damages.18 8
While Curran did not rule on damages,18 9 it is likely that the
damage award in a case brought under the Curran implied private
remedy would be the same as the award in a section 22 case. At
least with respect to damages, then, a plaintiff who brings a section
22 cause of action acquires no significant advantage over the plain-
tiff who brings a claim based on Curran.
6. Statute of Limitations
Section 22 provides that any plaintiff who seeks a private rem-
edy under the Act must bring the action no later than two years
183. Klatt v. International Trading Group, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,636, at 22,598 (CFTC June 21, 1978) (citing List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)).
184. Id.
185. Wong v. First London Commodity Options, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,834, at 23,414-15 (CFTC May 29, 1979).
186. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a), (b) (1982).
187. 1 T. Russo, supra note 11, § 12.43.
188. See Barker v. Commodity Management Sys., Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,432, at 21,756 (CFTC June 2, 1977) (damages in a repara-
tion proceeding are limited to making the complainant whole by restoring the commodity
account to what it was when it was opened); Deming v. Peck, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,157, at 24,735 (CFTC Feb. 27, 1981).
189. 456 U.S. at 395.
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from the time the cause of action accrued. 190 However, when a
court decides a statute of limitations question under Curran, it is
faced with little consistent law. In the pre-Curran period, courts
used various state laws to set the period of limitation. In one in-
stance, state securities law was used; 191 in another, state tort law
provided the rule.'9 2
Section 22 offers certainty regarding the limitations period, in
contrast to the myriad possibilities that exist for a Curran claim. 1
9 3
Plaintiffs who bring causes of action under Curran will benefit if the
court applies a limitation period that is longer than the two years
prescribed by the CEA.
B. Alternative Causes of Action
If aggrieved futures investors cannot bring their claims under
the CEA, they may turn to other bodies of law for relief.
1. State Common Law Claims
Courts have read section 2 of the CEA as permitting an investor
to sue in state court under common law forms of actions such as
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion. 194 Courts are split,
however, on whether actions may be brought under state statutes.
Most courts have held that claims under such statutes are not
actionable. 195
State common law claims may allow damage awards that are
more liberal than those available under section 22. For example, in
a case brought under Arizona law, the court awarded punitive dam-
190. 7 U.S.C. § 25(c) (1982).
191. Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The applicable Illinois statute
of limitations is three years. Id. at 119-20.
192. Jones v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1979). The statute of
limitations under the Kansas tort law is two years. Id. at 228.
193. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
194. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Lewis, 410 F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
195. E.g., Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker, 38 N.C. App. 414, 420, 248 S.E.2d
567, 570 (1978) (futures claim cannot be brought under state unfair trade practices law);
International Trading, Ltd. v. Bell, 262 Ark. 244, 250-53, 556 S.W.2d 420, 423-24, cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 956 (1977) (futures claim cannot be brought under state securities act); State v.
Monex Int'l, Ltd., 527 S.W.2d 804, 806-07 (Tex. App. 1975) (futures claim cannot be brought
under state securities act); Haines v. First Commodity Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,088, at 24,393 (Mass. Sup. Ct. May 21, 1980) (futures
claim cannot be brought under state consumer protection laws). But see, eg., Poplar Grove
Planting & Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 585, 592 (M.D. La. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 600 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1980) (futures claims may be brought under
state's law of mandate, concerning principal-agent relations).
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ages to a defrauded futures investor.1 96 As previously noted, sec-
tion 22 and futures case law generally limit damages to out-of-
pocket losses or lost profits. 197
State law may also provide a longer statute of limitations. For
example, the Illinois statute of limitations bars civil actions brought
more than three years after accrual of the claim, as compared with
the two-year statute of limitations in section 22.198
2. Federal Claims under RICO
An aggrieved futures investor may bring an action under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 19 9 in
conjunction with other remedies.2"o RICO is actually a compilation
of federal criminal offenses, or predicate crimes.201 It permits both
criminal and civil suits20 2 and empowers victims of the predicate
crimes to bring private suits against offenders.20 3
To use civil RICO, the futures investor must prove that the de-
fendant, among other things, engaged in a "pattern of racketeering
activity." 2' A "pattern of racketeering activity" arises when the
196. Kotz v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 685 F.2d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1982); see also
Harvitt, Defrauded Commodity Investors: What's In Their Futures, 71 ILL. B.J. 496 (1983)
(recommending addition of a common law fraud complaint under Illinois law to a CEA
action, to collect punitive damages).
197. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 191.
199. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982). RICO is contained in title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C. (1982)). The purpose of the OCCA is to provide
"enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime." Id. Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. at 923. The goal of RICO
is the "elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate orga-
nizations operating in interstate commerce." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76
(1970).
200. "Nothing in this title shall supersede any provision of federal, state, or other law
imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in
this title." OCCA § 904, 84 Stat. at 947.
201. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
202. Id. §§ 1963-64.
203. Id. § 1964(c). "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a viola-
tion of § 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
204. Id. § 1962. To prove a violation of § 1962, a plaintiff must specifically prove that:
(1) a person; (2) through a pattern; (3) of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful
debt; (4) directly or indirectly, (a) invests in, or (b) maintains an interest in, or (c) participates
in; (5) an enterprise; (6) the activities of which affect interstate commerce. See Long, Treble
Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws" A Suggested Analysis and Application
of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REv. 201, 211-41 (1981) (discussion of ele-
ments of proof under § 1962).
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defendant or defendants commit at least two violations of a predi-
cate offense within a ten-year period.2 °5 The plaintiff must also
show that there was injury to "business or property" 20 6 and that the
violation caused such injury.20 7
Although futures fraud is not among the predicate RICO of-
fenses, 2° 8 aggrieved futures investors nonetheless have successfully
asserted claims under RICO.209 The usual predicate crime is mail
fraud, 2 10 a claim that is not difficult to prove. 2 11  To obtain a
favorable judgment under civil RICO, the plaintiff has to prove that
the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity evidenced by two acts
of mail fraud occurring within ten years.212 At least one plaintiff
alleging futures fraud successfully stated such a claim.213
In a recent decision, however, the plaintiff was permitted to
maintain a cause of action under civil RICO even though there was
no mention of a predicate crime.2 14 In allowing the cause of action,
the court apparently found that civil RICO does not infringe on the
CFTC's exclusive regulatory authority and therefore is not pre-
empted by the CEA.215  But another court dismissed the RICO
claim of a futures investor on the grounds that the defendant had
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
206. Id. § 1964(c). The courts are split about whether competitive injury must be shown.
See Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (no express
requirement under RICO to show competitive injury). But see North Barrington Dev., Inc.
v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (plaintiff must show competitive injury).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). Securities fraud, by contrast, is one of the predicate
offenses. Id.
209. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Parnes I].
210. Id. The creation of the CFIC did not preempt use of the mail fraud statute against
fraudulent futures trading. United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 310 (1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. Abrahams, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,007, at
23,928-29 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1980).
211. United States v. Bethea, 672 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1982).
212. See id. at 419.
213. Paries I, 487 F. Supp. at 646. Even though the plaintiff successfully stated his claim
under RICO, he later lost on the merits. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp.
20, 24 (N.D. Ill. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Parnes II].
214. Vaeeariello v. Financial Partnership, Ltd., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,874 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1983).
215. Id. at 27,717. This rationale has been cited by other courts that have permitted state
common law claims for futures fraud. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. Although
the Vaccariello opinion does not mention a predicate crime, the plaintiffs in that case may
have based their suit on mail fraud. Similarly, the court in Heinold Commodities, Inc. v.
McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1979), held that a counterclaiming defendant could
bring an action under civil RICO even though the plaintiff had not been convicted of a predi-
cate crime.
1984]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
not committed a predicate act.2 16 Presumably, the court based its
holding on the omission of futures fraud from RICO's list of predi-
cate offenses.217
Inasmuch as the use of civil RICO to redress futures fraud is
relatively new, there is little judicial authority upon which the ag-
grieved futures investor may rely in determining whether or not his
claim is actionable. Decisions in civil RICO cases involving matters
other than futures fraud provide some direction, however. For in-
stance, an investor's suit against FCM managerial and nonmanager-
ial employees who were acting either individually or on behalf of
the FCM would probably be actionable.218 Further, a plaintiff in a
futures fraud suit would probably not be required to prove a nexus
between the defendant and organized crime.219
An aggrieved investor might encounter difficulty in maintaining
a civil RICO action against an organization. One court has held
that civil RICO is limited to suits against persons, not enter-
prises.220 But another court has ruled that a corporation may be a
defendant both as a person and as an enterprise under RICO.221 By
comparison, there is no confusion regarding the opportunity to sue
an organization under the CEA: section 22 of the Act expressly
allows such suits. 222
Use of civil RICO by futures investors has two major advan-
tages. First, successful plaintiffs under civil RICO may recover
treble damages.223 Under section 22, the plaintiff's recovery is lim-
216. Applegate v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) 21,881 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 1983). Regrettably, the court's opinion as re-
ported does not give much detail to support its holding. See id. at 27,748.
217. Id.
218. Cf. United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (civil RICO suit
actionable against both subordinates and managers); United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610,
617 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 823 (1983) (RICO does not require that the predi-
cate acts be in furtherance of the enterprise) (citing United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981)).
219. Cf Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("RICO requires neither
pleading nor proof of a nexus with organized crime." (citations omitted)). But cf Adair v.
Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (E.D. Ill. 1981) (application of RICO is
limited to entities involved in organized crime).
220. This principle was unsuccessfully tested in Parnes II, 548 F. Supp. at 24.
221. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 989-90 (11th Cir. 1982).
222. 7 U.S.C. § 25(b)(1) (1982).
223. Id. § 1964(c). One commentator has suggested that if antitrust law is used by anal-
ogy to determine damage awards in cases brought under RICO, then courts should liberally
grant damages in such cases. See Patton, Civil RICO: Statutory and Implied Elements of the
Treble Damage Remedy, 14 TEX. TECH L. REV. 377, 418 (1983) (successful plaintiffs should
recover any damages directly or derivatively sustained, including loss of past or future
profits).
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ited to actual damages.224 Second, the time period for bringing suit
under civil RICO is longer than that under section 22. A plaintiff
who brings a section 22 action must file his claim within two years
after the cause of action accrued,225 whereas for civil RICO actions,
courts have applied a federal criminal statute that specifies a five-
year limitation.226
Thus, aggrieved futures investors may find civil RICO useful in
claims against individuals. By using a mail fraud predicate offense
it is not difficult to frame a RICO complaint that may reap large
damage awards and offers a liberal limitations period. In light of
adverse court rulings, however, investors may be unable to bring a
civil RICO claim against organizations.227
V. CONCLUSION
With the Supreme Court's decision in Curran and Congress' en-
actment of section 22 of the CEA, the law is now settled that ag-
grieved futures investors may sue under the CEA.228 The section 22
right of action, however, has both advantages and disadvantages.
Perhaps its principal advantage is the certainty that it provides to
the parties to a futures dispute. Whereas Curran left open the ques-
tion of how the elements of the cause of action were to be defined,
section 22 provides at least a partial answer. It sets a clear standard
for damages and for the statute of limitations, and it carefully delin-
eates which market participants may be named as defendants.229 It
also gives some initial guidance on the matter of causation,
although the courts must ultimately determine the precise standard
that should apply.230 The principal disadvantage for plaintiffs is
that they must prove a very high level of culpability in order to
224. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1), (b)(1) (1982).
225. Id. § 25(c).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1134 (3d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Bethea, 672 F.2d 407, 419 (5th Cir. 1982). The statute reads, "Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense,
not capital, unless the indictment is found. . . within five years. . . after such offense shall
have been committed." 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982).
227. It may be especially difficult to bring a civil RICO action in the Second Circuit. In a
series of recent cases, that court has ruled that such suits must be based on prior criminal
convictions. It has expressed the view that Congress expected the criminality of the predicate
acts to be proved before permitting a civil racketeering suit. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984); Joel v. Cirrito, No. 84-7113, slip op. (2d Cir. July 27, 1984);
Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984).
228. See supra notes 55-103 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 186-93, 105-20 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
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successfully sue organizations and their controlling persons. As for
the culpability standard in actions against individuals, section 22
fails to provide any guidance at all.23' Moreover, the statute is un-
clear as to whether investors may sue individuals for violations of
not only the CEA but also CFTC rules, regulations, and orders.232
Aggrieved futures investors now have a wide variety of remedies
available to them. The enactment of the section 22 express right of
action opens federal courts to futures investors' claims which are
based on the CEA. In addition to the reparation procedure that is
available under the CEA,233 futures claims may be brought under
laws unconnected to the CEA. In particular, courts have permitted
investors to maintain actions under state common law and civilRICO provisions.23 Moreover, a cause of action under Curran
may yet be available for a very limited number of plaintiffs.235
The comparison of remedies available under Curran, the CEA,
state common law, and RICO suggests that an aggrieved futures
investor should carefully weigh the merits of each remedy before
choosing what kind of claim to file. By doing so, he can invoke the
remedy or combination of remedies that will best redress his injury.
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